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While Ms. Skollingsberg was watching Mr. Barber, his eight 
and ten year old sons went off in different directions and later 
rejoined their father. When the boys returned to their father they 
were carrying a large white plastic Z.C.M.I. bag (R. 131). Mr. 
Barber then took the white plastic bag and placed the Cabbage Patch 
doll and the brown plastic bag in the Z.C.M.I, bag and returned it 
to his youngest son (R. 132). The two boys then left their father 
(R. 132). 
Ms. Skollingsberg called for assistance in helping her 
watch Mr. Barber (R. 133). Another Z.C.M.I. employee, Mrs. Hansen, 
came up to the third floor to assist Ms. Skollingsberg (R. 162). 
When Mrs. Hansen found that her assistance was not required she got 
on the escalator to return to the second floor. Mr. Barber and his 
sons also got on the escalator behind Mrs. Hansen. Mrs. Hansen 
testified that while taking the escalator down to the second floor 
she overheard Mr. Barber tell his son to take what he had and ditch 
it in the toy department (R. 168). 
Mr. Barber and his two sons again separated and only the 
older son returned (R. 152). Mrs. Hansen then went to the toy 
department to see if she could find the younger son. Mrs. Hansen 
observed the boy and asked Mr. Hutchinson, a husband of a Z.C.M.I. 
employee, to follow the boy (R. 164). 
Mr. Hutchinson followed the boy outside the store to the 
parking terrace. Mr. Hutchinson then approached the boy and told 
him that he thought they should return to the store (R. 193). Mr. 
Hutchinson, over objection by defense counsel, testified that the 
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boy said, "I didn't want to do this. My Dad made me do this" (R. 
201). The Court overruled the objection ruling that the statement 
was not hearsay pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence, §801(d)(2)(D) 
(1983). 
Ms. Skollingsberg testified that she never lost sight of 
Mr. Barber (R. 145). David Bailey, another employee testified that 
five minutes before Mr. Barber was apprehended, Mr. Barber had 
notified Mr. Bailey that his son had taken something from his 
department (R. 171). Mr. Bailey then noticed that a video camera 
and recorder were missing. 
As Mr. Hutchinson was bringing the younger son back into 
the store Mr. Barber and the older son left the store. Mr. Barber 
and his sons then returned to the store with Mr. Hutchinson and the 
Z.C.M.I. employees. Mr. Barber then told the store employees that 
his younger son must have taken the doll and returned the doll to 
its display (R. 137). 
Mr. Barber was escorted to the security office with his 
sons. The younger son told Ms. Skollingsberg about the video camera 
and recorder. The boy took Ms. Skollingsberg to the toy department 
and retrieved the video recorder from under a display (R. 139). The 
boy also told Ms. Skollingsberg that the video camera was outside in 
the car (R. 140). 
Mr. Barber gave his keys to a sheriff's deputy who had 
arrived and arrested him (R. 183). The deputy found the video 
camera in a brown plastic bag on the front passenger seat of Mr. 
Barber's car (R. 185). 
At trial Mr. Bailey testified that the video camera and 
recorder sold together for over one thousand dollars, but that it 
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was not possible to determine a price for the camera alone (R. 
181). The State presented no evidence as to the value of the camera 
alone. Ms. Skollingsberg testified that the Cabbage Patch Doll sold 
for thirty six dollars (R. 137). 
At the close of the State's case defense counsel moved to 
dismiss for insufficient evidence or to amend the Information to 
reflect the fact that the only item linked to Mr. Barber was the 
thirty six dollar Cabbage Patch doll (R. 206, 207). The motions 
were denied. 
The jury found Mr. Barber guilty of Retail Theft, a second 
degree felony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first argument presented on appeal involves the trial 
court's error in admitting into evidence a statement made by Mr. 
Barber's son. The statement was hearsay and did not come under the 
agency exception that the trial court used in admitting the 
statement. 
The second argument is that insufficient evidence was 
presented to convict Mr. Barber of Retail Theft. The evidence did 
not show that Mr. Barber encouraged his sons to take the items or 
was otherwise criminally responsible for their actions. 
Finally/ Mr. Barber contends that the State did not prove 
that the retail value of the items taken exceeded one thousand 
dollars. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
HEARSAY TESTIMONY 
At trial, the State sought to introduce into evidence a 
statement allegedly made by Mr. Barber's eight year old son that "I 
didn't want to do this. My Dad made me do this" (R 201). Defense 
counsel objected to the admission of such statement on the grounds 
that it was inadmissible hearsay (R 194-201). The trial court 
admitted the statement, ruling that it was not hearsay pursuant to 
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) (R 199-200). 
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." 
The state introduced the statement allegedly made by Mr. 
Barber's son as proof of the matter asserted i.e. that Mr. Barber 
made his son steal the items. Therefore, the statement was hearsay 
unless it fit within the definition of nonhearsay contained in Rule 
801(d) Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). Rule 801 (d)(2)(D) provides: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay: 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is 
(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during 
the existence of the relationship. 
For the statement to be admissible as nonhearsay under the 
agency definition set forth above, the State must establish that an 
agency relationship existed and that the statement was made within 
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the scope and in furtherance of that relationship* See Utah Rules 
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). Agency is defined as "...a fiduciary 
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one 
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject 
to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Continental 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Taylorf 384 P.2d 796 (Utah 1963) citing 
American Law Institute Restatement of Agency 2d,§l. 
Agency relationships typically arise in the context of 
business relationships. Utah Rule of Evidence §801(d)(2)(D) 
specifically refers to employment situations, and case law 
discussing agency issues generally arise in such contexts. See City 
Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth/ 672 P2d 89(Utah 1983); see 
also Continental Bank and Trust v. Taylor/ supra. Generally/ where 
a principal-agent relationship existsf the agent is authorized by 
the principal to act as a substitute for the principal/ and to make 
contracts and otherwise act on behalf of the principal. 
Whether a child can act as an agent has not been addressed 
by the Utah Supreme Court. Mr. Barber contends that the concept of 
agency law precludes a finding that an eight year old child was 
legally capable of acting as an agent in the circumstances outlined 
in this case. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E)/ Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)/ provides 
for the admission of a statement by a co-conspirator as non 
hearsay. That section states: 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is 
(E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the 
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
While the trial court based its decision on the agency rule 
contained in 801(d)(2)(D)/ the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged 
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that "(t)he co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule ...is 
merely a rule of evidence founded to some extent on the concepts of 
agency law." State v. Gray 717 P2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986)citing U.S. 
v. Trowery 542 P2d 623f 626(3d Cir 1976)(Citations omitted) Cert den 
429 U.S. 1104, 1977). Hence, by analogy, the decisions under 801 
(d)(2)(E) are applicable in determining the admissibility of 
evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). 
In order to utilize the co-conspirator rule, the State must 
introduce evidence "independent and exclusive of the conspirator's 
hearsay statements themselves, showing the existence of a criminal 
joint venture and the defendant's participation therein". State v. 
Gray, supra at 1318. Allowing the State to prove an agency 
relationship or conspiracy with the disputed hearsay would permit 
"hearsay to lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of 
competent evidence." _Id. at 1318 citing Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 
60, 75 (1942). 
In the present case, the evidence did not establish that an 
agency relationship existed between Mr. Barber and his eight year 
old son. The State presented no evidence that an employment 
situation existed between Mr. Barber and his son. The State 
presented no evidence that Mr. Barber authorized his eight year old 
son to act on his behalf in a legal capacity. While arguably the 
statement allegedly made by the son suggests that he was acting 
under the direction of his father, it does not suggest an agency 
relationship in the legal sense. By analogy to the rule in 
co-conspirator cases, the State must establish an agency 
relationship by evidence independent of that statement; the State 
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produced no such independent evidence. Finally, Mr. Barber contends 
that an eight year old cannot legally act as agent. Because the 
evidence did not show that an agency relationship existed between 
Mr. Barber and his son, the trial court erred in ruling that the 
statement was admissible as nonhearsaye 
Assuming, arguendo, that the State proved by independent 
and exclusive evidence that an agency relationship existed, the 
statement allegedly made by the boy was made after the termination 
of such relationship and was outside the scope of such relationship 
and not in furtherance thereof, as required by Utah Rules of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). 
By analogy, case law discussing co-conspirator statements 
provides some elucidation. It is well established that a statement 
by a co-conspirator may only be used against another co-conspirator 
if the statement was made while the plan was still in existence and 
before its termination. See, Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 
440 (1949). In Krulewitch, the Supreme Court held that a statement 
made by a co-conspirator after the conspiracy ended was not in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
A conspiracy is usually deemed to end when the substantive 
crime that is the object of the conspiracy has been committed or 
threatened. State v. Darby, 599 P.2d 821 (Ari.App.1979), State v. 
Caldero, 705 P.2d 85 (Idaho App. 1985). Courts have held that 
statements made after arrest can no longer be introduced using the 
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. See United States v. 
Lam Lek Chong, 544 F.2d 58 (2d.Cir. 1976). The general rule is that 
a declaration of a co-conspirator made without the approval of the 
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accused after the conspiracy has ended may only be used against the 
declarant. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence §643 (13th ed. 1973 
and Supp 1986). 
In the present case, even if an agency relationship had 
existed, the boy's statement exceeded the scope of such relationship 
and was made after the termination thereof. Common sense suggests 
that even if the boy were acting as an agent for the purpose of 
taking items from the store, placing blame on his father was not 
part of his role as such an agent and did not further the activity 
of stealing items from the store. The statement itself clarified 
that had such a relationship existed, it was terminated. Assuming, 
arguendo, that an agency relationship had existed between Mr. Barber 
and his son, Mr. Hutchinson's apprehension of the boy ended any 
agency relationship which may have existed. 
Because an agency relationship did not exist between Mr. 
Barber and his son or, alternatively, if one did exist, the 
statement allegedly made by the boy was outside the scope of such 
relationship and not in furtherance thereof, the statement was 
inadmissible hearsay and the court erred in allowing the jury to 
hear it. 
Since the State presented very little evidence other than 
the statement to establish that Mr. Barber was directing his son's 
actions and due to the damaging nature of the statement, admitting 
the statement constitutes reversible error. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION OF RETAIL THEFT 
A jury convicted Mr. Barber of Retail Theft, a second 
degree felony in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 602 (1), 
(Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended) as charged in the Information. 
See Addendum A. He now argues that the state introduced 
insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for Retail Theft and 
requests reversal of the conviction. 
To convict a defendant of Retail Theft, the state must 
introduce evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the individual committed the crime charged. This standard is 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended): 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed 
to be innocent until each element of the offense 
charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, a defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-602 (1953 as amended) sets 
forth the elements required to prove that a defendant committed the 
crime of retail theft. That section provides: 
76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting. A 
person commits the offense of retail theft when 
he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, 
transfers or causes to be carried away or 
transferred, any merchandise displayed, held 
stored or offered for sale in a retail 
merchantile establishment with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with the intention 
of depriving the merchant permanently of the 
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise 
without paying the retail value of such 
merchandise; 
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The authority of the reviewing Court to reverse a judgment 
on sufficiency of the evidence is clear* The Utah Supreme Court 
stated in State v, Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983): 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, [viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict] is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted, 
(Citations omitted). 
In State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975), the Supreme 
Court also discussed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: 
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 
conviction, it must appear that viewing the 
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury, reasonable minds 
could not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In an earlier decision, State v. Williams, 180 P.2d 551, 
555 (Utah 1947) the Court acknowledged that the total picture 
presented by the record must be considered in reviewing an 
insufficiency claim: 
We are not unmindful of the settled rule that it 
is the province of the jury to weigh the 
testimony and determine the facts. Nevertheless, 
we cannot escape the responsibility of passing 
judgment upon whether under the evidence a jury 
could, in reason, conclude that the defendant's 
guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
is not to say that merely by reason of the fact 
that the circumstances surrounding an alleged 
assault of this nature created a reasonable doubt 
in the mind of this court that the offense was in 
fact committed, we will set aside a verdict. The 
total picture presented by the record here 
considered must be kept in mind in evaluating the 
result here reached. 
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Clearly then, each case must turn upon its own facts as to 
whether a verdict must be overturned due to the insufficiency of the 
evidence. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-202, (1953 as amended) 
outlines the situation where an individual can be held criminally 
responsible for the conduct of another. That section provides: 
Criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another.—Every person, 
acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
In the present case, Mr. Barber was connected to the crime 
only through his presence at the scene, a statement which was 
overheard by store personnel, and a statement made by his son. 
There is no evidence that Mr. Barber solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided his sons in the 
shoplifting. 
Ms. Skollingsberg testified that she never lost sight of 
Mr. Barber (R. 145). She did not testify that she saw Mr. Barber 
take any merchandise from the store. Ms. Skollingsberg was standing 
close enough to Mr. Barber to hear him tell his older son that they 
might have to seek help in finding the younger boy (R. 153) yet she 
never offered any testimony that Mr. Barber encouraged his sons' 
shoplifting. 
Mrs. Hansen also was able to overhear part of Mr. Barber's 
conversation with his sons but did not hear any conversations which 
show that Mr. Barber encouraged his sons to steal anything. 
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Mrs. Hansen testified that she overheard Mr. Barber tell his son to 
take what he had and to ditch it in the toy department (R. 169). 
This testimony indicates that if Mr. Barber had any knowledge of his 
son's shoplifting he was attempting to end it and have his son 
return the merchandise he had taken. This argument is strengthened 
by the fact that Mr. Barber voluntarily sought out a salesman to 
indicate that his son had stolen some video equipment and that he 
would bring his son back to the department (R. 130, 132). This 
testimony shows that when Mr. Barber became aware of his son's 
activities, he did everything he could to make sure the merchandise 
was returned to the store. 
Mr. Hutchinson testified that when he asked by Mr. Barber's 
eight year old son to accompany him back to the store the boy said, 
"I didn't want to do this. My Dad made me do this" (R. 201). This 
is the most damaging testimony offered by the prosecution to 
establish guilt on the part of Mr. Barber. As previously outlined, 
Mr. Barber contends that the statement was inadmissible hearsay. 
Assuming the statement was admissible, it seems little more than an 
attempt by a young boy to escape blame for something he did. There 
is no corroborating evidence that proves that the Mr. Barber's 
actions amounted to criminal responsibility on his part. 
The state presented no evidence that Mr. Barber knowingly 
took any of the store merchandise with the intention of permanently 
depriving the store of its use or possession. Mr. Barber was seen 
holding two plastic shopping bags but the only merchandise any of 
the store personnel actually saw in his possession was the Cabbage 
Patch Doll (R. 131-132). 
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Tne evidence in this case was so inconclusive that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
Mr. Barber knew about the planned shoplifting before it occurred and 
intentionally aided the boys in removing items from the store. 
Because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Barber committed the crime of retail theft, the 
conviction must be reversed. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE VALUE 
OF THE ITEMS TAKEN EXCEEDED ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (1953, as amended) classifies 
theft offenses according to the value of the items taken. That 
section provides in pertinent part: 
76-6-412. Theft—Classification of 
offenses—(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punishable as 
follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services 
exceeds $1,0000; or 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is 
more than $250 but not more than $1,000; or 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was more than $100 but does not 
exceed $250. 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was $100 or less. 
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As outlined in Point II, Mr. Barber contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was 
involved in a theft of any merchandise. Assuming, arguendo, that 
the evidence supported a conviction for theft, Mr. Barber contends 
that the theft should have been classified as a Class B Misdemeanor, 
in violation of 76-6-412 (d) since the State failed to produce 
evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
value of items taken exceeded one hundred dollars. 
For an individual to be convicted of theft, the State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual intended to 
permanently deprive another of the items in questions. See State v. 
Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984). Once the State has established that 
a theft occurred, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
value of any items taken. See §76-6-412,Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
In this case, the State did not produce sufficient evidence 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Barber intended to 
permanently deprive the store of the possession, use or benefit of 
the recorder. At best, the activity amounted to an attempted theft 
of the recorder and therefore the value of the recorder cannot be 
considered in classifying the offense. 
Attempt is defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101. That 
section provides in pertinent part: 
76-4-101. Attempt—Elements of offense.—(1) 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission 
of the offense. 
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(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does 
not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to 
commit the offense. 
In People v. Falgares, 328 N.E.2d 210 (111 App. 1975) the 
court held that placing articles in a brown paper bag and moving to 
another part of the store did not complete the final act required 
for theft but showed only attempted theft. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Barber is linked to the 
removal of the recorder from the video department pursuant to the 
state's theory of the case, there nevertheless is no evidence 
showing that Mr. Barber intended to permanently deprive the store of 
the recorder. The salesman in the video department conversed with 
Mr. Barber, but the recorder was already gone from the department 
(R. 172). Mr. Barber informed the salesman that he believed 
something was missing from the department at that time (R. 171). 
Mr. Barber told the salesman that his son had a problem with 
stealing and that he would try to find the boy and bring him back to 
the department (R. 171). Prior to this conversation, the salesman 
had not realized anything was missing from the department (R. 179). 
Mr. Barber was apprehended as he left the store looking for 
his son (R. 136-137). The video recorder was still in the store 
when he was stopped (R. 139). The evidence shows that he was 
leaving the store when apprehended and therefore had no intent to 
permanently deprive the store of the merchandise. Even accepting 
the State's theory of the case, the actions amounted to no more than 
an attempted theft and therefore, the value of the recorder cannot 
be considered in classifying the theft offense. 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-6-601 (1953, as amended) defines retail 
value as "the merchant's stated or advertised price of the 
merchandise." The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the value 
of property taken is the market value. State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 
(Utah 1977). 
Since the evidence was insufficient to establish a theft of 
the recorder, the only items that could be considered in classifying 
the level of the theft are the Cabbage Patch Doll and the video 
camera. The State failed to present any evidence as to the value of 
the camera alone. Mr. Bailey testified that it was impossible to 
determine the retail value of the video camera without the video 
recorder (R. 181). Absent such evidence, the state failed to prove 
the value of the camera beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore the 
camera cannot be considered in classifying the level of theft 
pursuant to §76-6-412, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
Assuming for the purposes of argument that Mr. Barber was 
criminally responsible for the theft of the Cabbage Patch Doll, the 
value of that item is the only value to be considered in determining 
the classification of the theft. Ms. Skollingsberg testified that 
the Cabbage Patch Doll had a retail value of thirty six dollars (R. 
137). Based on this testimony, and assuming this Court finds there 
was sufficient evidence to hold Mr. Barber criminally liable for the 
actions of his sons, Mr. Barber should have been sentenced under 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (d) for Retail Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, Anthony 
Barber requests this Court to reverse his conviction for Retail 
Theft, a second degree felony, and remand this case to the trial 
court for dismissal, a new trial or an order that the conviction for 
this case be for theft, a Class B Misdemeanor * 
Respectfully submitted this j \ day of March, 1987. 
tmx. CYfrvrdJ 
LISA J. RE/AL 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LISA J. REMAL, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this U 
day of March, 1987. 
LISA J. RE^L 
Attorney for Appellant 
I, ____^^ , delivered the foregoing 
copies this day of March, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM A 
T.L. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
By: DAVID S. WALSH 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtsids Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 F% -M 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) Screened by: D S Walsh 
Assigned to: D S Walsh 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
ANTHOXY G. BARBER DOB 11/27/5 3, ) 
BAIL $5,000.00 
TMCADMA TTAM 
Criminal No. 
) dor a Defendant(s). ' fQ KfTC* ' 2 8 0 3 
The undersigned Monte Kartchner - SO under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
RETAIL THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 4855 South Highland Drive, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 23, 
1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 602(1), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as awended, in that the defendant, 
ANTHONY G. BARBER, a party to the offense, did take 
possession of, conceal, carry away, transfer or cause to be 
carried away or transferred, merchandise displayed, held, 
stored, or offered for sale in a retail mercantile 
establishment, to-wit: ZCMI, such merchandise consisting of 
video camera, Cabbage Patch Kid, and that said defendant did 
so with the intention o£ retaining such merchandise or with 
the intent to permanently deprive said merchant of the 
possession, use • or benefit of such merchandise, without 
paying the retail value of such merchandise, to-wit: 
$1,900,00; 
(Continued on page Two) 
INFORMATION 
STATE v. ANTHONY G. BARBER 
County Attorney #85-1-68128 
Page Two 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Monte D Kartchner Lloyd Prescott Milan Buehler 
Kathy Skollingsberg David R Bailey Stephen F Hutchinson 
Judith A. Hansen 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Affiant, a deputy with the Sheriff's Office has spoken to the 
following persons and states: 
1) On November 23, 1985, Kathy Skollingberg, a security guard with 
ZCMI followed defendant his 2 sons, age 8 and 10, around ZCMI. She 
noticed defendant place a cabbage patch kid in a ZCMI sack. 
2) Judith Hansen overheard the defendant tell his one son to hide 
what he had in his sack in th toy departmento 
3) During the course of the stolking, defendant was handling a 
Ivolfes sack. 
4) Upon being questioned, defendant gave permission to affiant, for 
him to search defendant's car. In the car was found the Wolfes sack 
which contained a video camera. 
5) The value of the property taken exceeded $1,900.00 
Affiant , ..'.,.". 
Sjubs-e-rdbed; anxT ^ sworn to before m 
this ~zv ..dayjWf) December, 1985. 
Judge ' 
V6u> 
"< hS: 
Authorized Cor presentment and 
filing: ^ y I 
T.L. ."TED" CANNON, County,-Attorney 
J / 
L ^ 
-;—Deputy 
:^UM'r:u^' 
